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Online copyright infringement1 LRDP Kantor in association with Centre
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processing of personal data and on the free m
4 Article 2, a) of Directive 95/46/EC.
5 Recital 26 of Directive 95/46/EC.
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Internet Protocol addresses [IP addresses] are central for Internet electronic communica-
tions. They individualize computers and their users to make the delivery of data packets
possible. IP addresses are also often used to identify websurfers for litigation purposes. In
particular, they constitute a key in the fight against online copyright infringement to
identify infringers. However, it is a matter of dispute to know if IP addresses are personal
data. In a review of relevant case law, the present paper seeks to identify when IP
addresses are e or should be e considered as personal data. It suggests a contextual
approach to the concept of personal data.
ª 2011 Jean-Philippe Moiny. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction have to be identifiers of websurfers in the hands of InternetA recent study has underlined that “in respect of the concept
of “personal data” and “data subject”, important questions
remain about anonymisation and pseudonymisation, re-
identifiability, data on “things” that or linked to people (like IP
addresses and traffic and location data), and “profiling”. National
laws and practices still give widely differing answers to these
questions. [.] [W]e fear that these questions are still inade-
quately dealt with at both EU-and national level”1 (emphasis
added by author).
The present paper seeks to clarify the status of Internet
Protocol [IP] addresses2 according to Directive 95/46/EC,3 the
general data protection Directive. The reasoning starts in
Section 2 of the paper from the observations that IP addressesfor Public Reform, Korff
rticular in the light of Tec
ission, Directorate-Gene
ies/new_privacy_challeng
tive Study on Different A
efers to Internet Protocol
ent and of the Council of
ovement of such data, O
Philippe Moiny. PublishedAccess Providers. Section 3 considers how they are used to
identify and sue websurfers. It then discusses in Section 4
different arguments against the status of IP addresses as
personal data. In this respect, personal data is defined as “ any
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural
person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one who can
be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference
to an identification number or to one or more factors specific
to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or
social identity”.4 In addition “to determine whether a person
is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means likely
reasonably to be used either by the controller or by any other
person to identify the said person”.5 Finally, in Section 5 of the
paper consideration is given to the difficult issue as to when IPD, Brown I (core experts) et al. Comparative Study on Different
hnological Developments. Final report delivered in the framework
ral Justice, Freedom and Security, 20 January 2010, from http://ec.
es/final_report_en.pdf, p. 28, [accessed 15.09.10]. The overall
pproaches to New Privacy Challenges”.
version 4 [IPv4].
24 October 1995, on the protection of individuals with regard to the
.J. L 281, 23.11.1995, hereinafter referred to as “Directive 95/46/EC”.
by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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The ambit of the paper is not to be exhaustive, but it
nonetheless refers to various case law from different e even
non-EU e States.2. IP addresses have to be identifiers
As traffic data, IP addresses fall under the confidentiality of
electronic communication enshrined in Directive 2002/58/EC,
the e-Privacy Directive.6 This notably means that Internet
Access Providers [IAPes] cannot reveal who are the parties to
an electronic communication occurring through a public
communication network.7 However, Member States may
adopt legislative measures to restrict the scope of this
confidentiality of telecommunication data “when such
restriction constitutes a necessary, appropriate and
proportionate measure within a democratic society to
safeguard national security (i.e. State security), defence,
public security, and the prevention, investigation, detection
and prosecution of criminal offences or of unauthorized use
of the electronic communication system, as referred to in
Article 13(1) of Directive 95/46/EC.8,9” Especially, data
retention duties exist at the European level (Section 2.1), and
it can also be asked if such duties might be contractually
provided (Section 2.2).
2.1. Legal retention and access duties
Firstly, European IAPes have data retention obligations
according to Directive 2006/24/EC (Data Retention Directive)106 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 July 2002, concerning the processing of personal
data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communica-
tions sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communica-
tions), O.J. L 201, 31.7.2002, hereinafter referred to as “Directive
2002/58”.
7 See Article 5.1 of Directive 2002/58/EC. As regards theses
concepts, see notablyMoiny J-P. Cloudy weather cloud based social
networks sites: under whose control?. In: Dudley-Sponaugle A,
Braman J, Vincenti G, editors. Investigating cyber law and cyber
ethics: issues, impacts and practices. IGI Global, forthcoming
2011.
8 “As regards the exception relating to unauthorized use of the
electronic communications system, this appears to concern use
which calls into question the actual integrity or security of the
system”, (ECJ, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), January
29, 2008, Promusicae v. Telefónica, Case C-275/06, European Court
Reports 2008, p. I-00271, no. 52).
9 Article 15.1 of Directive 2002/58/EC.
10 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 15 March 2006, on the retention of data generated or
processed in connection with the provision of publicly available
electronic communications services or of public communications
networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC, OJ L105, 13.4.2006,
hereinafter referred to as “Directive 2006/24/EC”. The Directive
applies to “traffic and location data on both legal entities and
natural persons and to the related data necessary to identify the
subscriber or registered user” (Article 1.2 of Directive 2006/24/EC).
Before the adoption of Directive 2006/24/EC, Member States laws
generally already compelled IAPes to retention duties (now
harmonized e to some extent e through the Directive).and its national implementation. The Data Retention
Directive provides derogation from the provisions of
Directive 2002/58/EC dealing with confidentiality of
electronic communications.11 IAPes notably have to record
the name and address of the subscriber or registered user
and the allocated IP addresses.12 This means that they make
it possible to identify who made any electronic
communication through their service. Of course, if IAPes
have a data retention obligation,13 they also have to give
access to these data to the competent national authorities
according to Member State’s laws.14 This processing of
personal data15 e retention and communication of data e are
limited to a defined purpose: “the investigation, detection
and prosecution of serious crime [grave infractions], as defined
by each Member State in its national law”.16 The text of the
Directive itself refers to serious crime, and some recitals
illustrate it by quoting terrorism17 and organized crime,18
while recital 5 of Directive 2006/24/EC more generally refers
to the investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal
offences. Recital 9 is even broader referring to Article 8 ECHR
and the purposes it provides as regards the possible
limitations to the right to privacy. Data Retention
requirements create an exception to the confidentiality of
electronic communications and must be strictly construed.
And a strict interpretation of the text of the Directive
requires that the processing at stake have a purpose limited
to the investigation, detection and prosecution of serious
crime as defined by Member States. Moreover, rules
establishing such processing have to “be accessible to the
person concerned and foreseeable as to its effects”.19 Since
criminal offences (“infractions pénales”) cover numerous and
varied behaviors (e.g.: defamation, assault, copyright11 Article 3.1 of Directive 2006/24/EC.
12 Article 5.1, (a), (2), (iii), and (c), (2), (i), of Directive 2006/24/EC.
13 More precisely, data have to be retained to the extent they
“are generated or processed by providers of publicly available
electronic communications services or of public communications
network within their jurisdiction in the process of supplying
the communications services concerned”, article 3.2 of Direc-
tive 2006/24 (emphasis added by author). As regards the
services and networks at stake, see article 2.1 of Directive
2006/24 and article 2 (a), (c) and (d) of Directive 2002/21/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002,
on a common regulatory framework for electronic communi-
cations networks and services (Framework Directive), OJ L 108,
24.4.2002, hereinafter referred to as “Directive 2002/21”. See
also Moiny J-P. Cloudy weather cloud based social networks
sites: under whose control?. In: Dudley-Sponaugle A, Braman J,
Vincenti G, editors. Investigating cyber law and cyber ethics:
issues, impacts and practices. IGI Global, forthcoming 2011,
footnote no. 179.
14 Article 4 of Directive 2006/24/EC.
15 The Directive applying to data related to legal entities, such
data are not, prima facie, personal data according to Directive
95/46/EC since they do not relate to a living individual.
See infra the developments related to Network Address
Translation.
16 Article 1.1 of Directive 2006/24/EC.
17 Recitals 8, 9 and 10 of Directive 2006/24/EC.
18 Recitals 7 and 9 of Directive 2006/24/EC.
19 ECHR, Judgment (Grand Chamber), May 4, 2000, Rotaru
v. Romania, Application no. 28341/95, no. 52. See nos. 55e56.
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etc.), Member States have to define which of these behaviors
are serious and therefore potentially mandate access to the
retained telecommunications data by the competent
authorities. As an example of an international definition of
“serious crime”, the United Nations Convention against
transnational organized crime refers to a “conduct
constituting an offence punishable by a maximum
deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious
penalty”.20 Member States law must also define how long
the above-mentioned data have to be retained by IAPes. This
period has to last at least six months and up to two years at
most, from the date of the communication.21
Secondly, since Article 15.1 of Directive 2002/58/EC
refers to Article 13.1 of Directive 1995/46/EC, Member States
can also derogate from the confidentiality of electronic
communications for other purposes provided in this latter
disposition.22 For instance, one of these purposes is “the
protection of the data subject or of the rights and
freedoms of others”.23 In other words, derogations from
Directive 2002/58/EC may also be adopted for civil and
non-criminal purpose. In this respect, for instance, the
confidentiality of telecommunications can be threatened
for the purpose of fighting against copyright infringement.
Member States are able e but not obliged24 e to require
a duty of disclosure of personal data in civil proceedings.25 As
regards the fight against online copyright infringement,
Member States have to “reconcile the requirements of the
protection of different fundamental rights, namely the right
to respect for private life on the one hand and the rights
to protection of property and to an effective remedy on
the other”, to achieve a “fair balance” between these rights,20 Article 2, b) of the United Nations Convention against Trans-
national Organized Crime adopted by General Assembly resolu-
tion 55/25 of 15 November 2000. In Belgium and France, for
instance, copyright infringement is punishable e second offence
and aggravating circumstances put aside e by a maximum
deprivation of liberty of three years. Which do not meet the
gravity of the cited definition of serious crime. See notably and
respectively in Belgium and France, Articles 80 and 81 of the Loi
relative au droit d’auteur et aux droits voisins du 30 juin 1994,
M.B., 27 juillet 1994, and Articles L-335.2, L-335.3 and L-335.4 of
the Code de la propriété intellectuelle.
21 Article 6 of Directive 2006/24.
22 See Promusicae v. Telefónica, ECJ 2008, no. 53.
23 Article 13.1, (g) of Directive 1995/46/EC. See also Article 13.1 (d),
(e) and (f) for other purposes than which that are specified in
Article 15.1 of Directive 2002/58/EC.
24 The Court ruled that article 8.1 of Directive 2004/48/EC
(Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 29 April 2004 on the Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights, O.J. L 157, 30.4.2004), articles 15.2 and 18 of
Directive 2000/31 (Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of
information society services, in particular electronic commerce,
in the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’), O.J. L
178, 17.7.2000, hereinafter referred to as “Directive 2000/31/EC”)
and articles 41, 42 and 47 of the TRIPS do not require Member
States to lay down an obligation to communicate personal data in
the context of civil proceedings, see Promusicae v. Telefónica, ECJ
2008, nos. 58e60.
25 Promusicae v. Telefónica, ECJ 2008, no. 54.and to respect the principle of proportionality.26 It’s
always the same old song. As regards France for instance,
the “HADOPI” statute27 plans the processing of personal
telecommunication data, a processing called “management
system of measures for the protection of works on internet”
(“Système de gestion des mesures pour la protection des œuvres sur
internet”28). In this respect, IP addresses are precisely
presented as the principal means to identify copyright
infringers.29
Thirdly, as regards the data retention obligation, Article 15
of Directive 2000/31/EC (the E-Commerce Directive30) has to
be pointed out. It specifies that: “Member States may
establish obligations for information society service providers
[.] to communicate to the competent authorities, at their
request, information enabling the identification of
recipients of their service with whom they have storage
agreements” (emphasis added by author). Referring to
“information society services” involving “storage
agreements”, this obligation can therefore concern other
providers than “electronic communications services” or
“public communications network” providers.31 Indeed, the
definition of an “information society service”32 (websites
providers, web 2.0 platform providers, cloud computing
service providers, etc.) is broader. For instance, while it can
be considered that a social network site such as Facebook is
not an electronic communications service according to
Directive 2002/21/EC, it is clearly an information society
service.33 This retention obligation that Member States may
impose on some information society service providers could
be realized by requiring them to record the IP addresses used
by their services’ users. As mentioned above, since IAPes26 Promusica v. Telefónica, ECJ 2008, nos. 65e68. More recently, see
ECJ, Order of the Court (Eight Chamber), February 19, 2009.
LSG-Gesellschaft zur Wahrnehmung von Leistungsschutzrechten GmbH
v. Tele2 Telecommunication GmbH, Case C-557/07, European Court
reports 2009, p. I-01227.
27 Loi no. 2009-669 du 12 juin 2009 favorisant la diffusion et la
protection de la création sur internet, http://www.legifrance.
gouv.fr/.
28 See Décret n 2010-236 du 5 mars 2010 relatif au traitement
automatisé de données à caractère personnel autorisé par
l’article L. 331-29 du code de la propriété intellectuelle dénommé
“Système de gestion des mesures pour la protection des œuvres
sur internet”, available on http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/.
29 See Macrez F, Gossa J. “Surveillance et sécurisation: ce que
l’Hadopi rate, A propos de la “petite loi” “Création et Internet”.
Revue Lamy Droit de l’Immatériel, no. 50, 2009, p. 85.
30 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information
society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the
Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’), O.J. L 178,
17.7.2000, hereinafter referred to as “Directive 2000/31/EC”.
31 See supra footnote no. 13.
32 See Article 1, 2), a) Directive 98/48/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 20 July 1998 amending Directive 98/34/
EC laying down a procedure for the provision of information in
the field of technical standards and regulations, O.J. L 217, 5.8.
1998.
33 See Moiny J-P. Cloudy weather cloud based social networks
sites: under whose control?. In: Dudley-Sponaugle A, Braman J,
Vincenti G, editors. Investigating cyber law and cyber ethics:
issues, impacts and practices. IGI Global, forthcoming 2011.
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when, during a period of at least six months, IP addresses
can identify individuals. The recording of IP addresses could
be deemed less intrusive than to require online identification
through an electronic ID. It could also be considered more
effective than to contractually require users to identify
themselves by completing relevant fields on a webpage. For
instance in France, Article 6.II of “LCEN” statute34 compels
providers of some online data storage services35 to hold and
keep data, ensuring the possibility of identifying anybody
who contributed to the creation of content involved in these
services. In this respect, waiting for a decree to specify the
relevant data to retain, the Tribunal de Grande Instance of Paris
has already deemed (in Magdane et al. v. YouTube (TGI Paris
2009)36, Lafesse et al. v. Google et al. (TGI Paris 2009)37 and J.F.
v. SAS Networks (TGI Paris 2008)38) that the record of the
users’ IP addresses and their registration information (email
addresses, names, etc., that can be fake, or temporary as
regards the email) was sufficient to fulfill this obligation; IP
addresses make it possible to identify the subscriber to the IA
service.2.2. Contractual retention and access duties?
In the end one wonders whether retention of electronic
communications data could not be contractually provided.
This could be useful to compensate for the lack of a Member
State’s national law in not explicitly allowing the processing
of telecommunications data for the purpose of the fight
against online copyright infringement. Indeed, with the
unambiguous consent (defined by Directive 95/46/EC)39 of all
the users40 e i.e. not necessarily the subscribers to the IA
service at stake e involved in an electronic communication,34 Loi n2004-575 du 21 juin 2004 pour la confiance dans l’écon
omie numérique (consolidée au 11 juillet 2010, retrieved o
October 4, 2010, from http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr.
35 For more precision as regards the definition of the targete
provider, see Article 6.I-2 of LCEN.
36 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, summary judgmen
(ordonnance de référé), March 5, 2009, Magdane et al. v. YouTub
retrieved on October 4, 2010, from http://www.legalis.net/. Th
question has not been contested on appeal, see Cour d’appel d
Paris (Court of Appeal), 4th Chamber, Judgment, March 26, 201
YouTube v. Magdanes et al., retrieved on October 4, 2010, from
http://www.legalis.net/.
37 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, 3d Chamber, Judgmen
June 24, 2009, Lafesse et al. v. Google et al., retrieved on October
2010, from http://www.legalis.net/. See Trézéguet M. “Prestataire
du web 2.0: l’adresse IP est une donnée personnelle”. Revue Lam
du Droit de l’Immatériel, no. 51, 2009, pp. 47e48.
38 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, summary judgmen
(ordonnance de référé), June 23, 2008, J.F. v. SAS Networks, p.
retrieved on October 4, 2010, from http://www.juriscom.net/jp
visu.php?ID¼1089.
39 “Save as otherwise provided, the definitions in Directive 95/4
EC [.] shall apply” (Article 2, al. 1 of Directive 2002/58/EC). S
Article 2, h) of Directive 95/46/EC.
40 That is to say: “any natural person using a publicly availab
electronic communications service, for private or busines
purposes, without necessarily having subscribed to this service




















then traffic data e and even content data e can be stored for
a specific purpose and period of time.41 In Ireland, as the
case EMI Records et al. v. Eircom (IEHC 2010)42 shows, Eircom
tried to confine the online copyright infringement through
a contractually based three steps procedure. This procedure
can ultimately lead to the cut-off of recalcitrant users’
Internet connection. Subscribers support the effects of the
procedure by being identified via their IP addresses. Major
companies (EMI Records, Sony, etc.) concluded an agreement
with IAP Eircom setting the procedure. The measures taken
against subscribers are legally based on the contract they
concluded with the IAP.43 The three steps procedure works
as follows.44 Production societies e or a hired computer
agency such as DtecNet45 e use software scanning the
whole Internet (but focusing on Ireland) to identify IP
addresses of websurfers illegally sharing copyrighted
material over peer-to-peer networks.46 Traffic and content
relevant data (IP addresses, time, file shared, etc.) are then
stored to be communicated to Eircom. On the first
infringement, the subscriber identified through the IP
address is told with his bill that a copyright infringement
occurred as regards specific copyrighted material at
a definite time. On a second infringement recorded and
involving an IP address related to this same subscriber,
a formal letter has then to be sent by Eircom. These two
steps occur automatically. Finally on a third infringement
notification, an Eircom employee is involved in the
procedure (assessing the evidence at stake) and sends
a termination notice. This latter informs the subscriber that
his connection will be cut-off after 14 days. Of course, the
cut-off knows some exceptions, and the subscriber is
entitled to make representations to Eircom: representations
that the IAP has to consider. In such a context, there is no
doubt that that IAP Eircom (as regards rights owners or
collecting societies, see infra) processes personal data.
As regards this particular kind of procedure, different
remarks have to be made. Firstly, the data at stake relate to
offences and as such have to be processed according to Article
8.5 of Directive 95/46.47 This means that if they are not
processed under the control of official authority e which is
the case e, “suitable specific safeguards” have to be provided41 Article 5.1 of Directive 2002/58/EC.
42 High Court (Ireland), Judgment, April 16, 2010, EMI Records,
Sony BMG Music; Universal Music and Warner Music. v. Eircom, [2010]
IEHC 108.
43 There is of course a contract between any subscriber an Eir-
com, and this agreement provides that it may be suspended or
terminated for breach of its terms, terms that forbid to create,
host or transmit copyright infringing materials (EMI Records et al.
v. Eircom (IEHC 2010), no. 14).
44 EMI Records et al. v. Eircom (IEHC 2010), nos. 9e13.
45 See http://dtecnet.com/.
46 See EMI Records et al. v. Eircom (IEHC 2010), no. 20.
47 See notably in the same sense, the position of the Belgian
Privacy Commission, Avis d’initiative concernant la compatibilité
de la recherche d’infractions au droit d’auteur sur Internet avec
les dispositions juridiques protégeant les données à caractère
personnel et les communications, n44/2001, November 12, 2001;
European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion on the current
negotiations by the European Union of an Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement (ACTA), O.J. C 147, 5.6.2010, nos. 51e52.
c om p u t e r l aw & s e c u r i t y r e v i ew 2 7 ( 2 0 1 1 ) 3 4 8e3 6 1352under national law. Secondly, traffic data are processed by
production societies and the IAP while the consent of the
users concerned by the electronic communications at stake
is not asked. And yet, these consents are required according
to Article 5.1 of Directive 2002/58 that limits the possibilities
of using electronic communications and traffic data but of
course, save as otherwise provided by national law legally
derogating from the Directive. Thirdly, it could be imagined
that the contract between the subscriber and the IAP
contains the former’s consent to the processing of the
above-mentioned. For instance, the contract48 could provide
the following statement: “by subscribing to our services, you
agree that traffic data will be stored and monitored for
copyright infringement purposes as detailed infra, etc.”. This
contract could then further compel a subscriber to make any
individual using his Internet access service to agree to such
a monitoring of his own use e as a user e of the subscriber’s
Internet access service (e.g. via a third-party beneficiary
clause).49,50 In these cases, our view is that the subscribers/
users’ consent would not be freely given because all IAPes of
the relevant market would propose such agreements.51
Subscribers/users would have no other choice than abiding
to the processing. In other words, the processing at stake is
not based on the subscriber/users’ consents.
This finally leads to the following further consideration: if
IAPes require their subscribers to agree that such IAPes can
identify them vis-à-vis collecting societies (or right holders)
when copyright infringements are alleged e which diverges
from the Irish case above e, two difficulties arise. On the one
hand, IAPes would still have to obtain the consent of users
(when a user is not the subscriber), save as otherwise provided
by national law (according to Article 15.1 of Directive 2002/58/
EC). On the other hand, the consent of the subscriber would48 It should also be underlined that if the collection of users’ IP
addresses and of the relevant linked pieces of information by
collecting societies are to be considered a processing of personal
data e which should be the case e, these societies should also be
a party to the contract concluded between the IAP and its users.
Otherwise, they would have to find another mean to get users/
subscribers’ consents.
49 It has to be noted that consents of all users/subscribers con-
cerned being required, an IAP could then only process data
related to its own users/subscribers. In other words, both parties
to the communication would have to be one of its subscribers. To
allow the IAP to process traffic data when a user concerned by the
electronic communication is a subscriber of another IAP, a third-
beneficiary clause would be needed. Such a clause, for instance,
would be stipulated in the contract between this other IAP and
his users.
50 The consent of users could also be more efficiently required,
for instance, by the providers of software making it possible to
share data through peer-to-peer network. However, when the
user is not the subscriber to the IA service, IAP will not be able to
process personal registration data because they will lack the
consent of their subscriber to the processing at stake.
51 “Since it was likely to be deeply unfair that only Eircom with
about 40% of the market share, as the defendant in these
proceedings, should bear the burden of this settlement, thus
activating the winds of market forces to drive customers towards
Eircom’s competitors, the plaintiffs agreed to initiate similar
proceedings against other internet service providers in the State”
(EMI Records et al. v. Eircom (IEHC 2010), no. 10).still not be freely given, whereas it should be.52 To sum up, in
our view, IAPes should not legally be able, contractually and
generally, to identify their subscribers to the music industry,
collecting societies, right holders or more generally legal
claimants without a “legislative measure” of national law e
clear, accurate, therefore predictable, and proportinate53 e
adopted according to Article 15.1 of Directive 2002/58/EC.
In conclusion, IP addresses allocated by “European”54 IAPes
have, at least, legally to relate to the subscribers of the IA services
for a period of time that Member States have set (between six
months and two years), for specific purposes that Member
States have to define according to Directive 2006/24/EC and
Articles 15.1 of Directive 2002/58/EC as well as Article 13.1 of
Directive 95/46/EC.
3. Use of IP addresses to identify and sue
websurfers
Because they constitute an identifier, IP addresses are pro-
cessed to identify and to suewebsurfers. IP addresses are keys
to the identification of online copyright infringement. The
fight against this kind of infringement has internationally
existed for some time now depending on the country at stake.
Clearly in this fight: “with the assistance of the ISPs, the cloak
of anonymity can be pierced and the true identity of the
infringers may be revealed”.55
In France, the processing of IP addresses has already been
used particularly to sue copyright infringement by individual
up/downloaders and therefore to identify them. This occurred
before the enactment of the HADOPI statute previously
evoked. Agents of collecting societies (SACEM and SDRM) used
software enabling file sharing over peer-to-peer networks to
identify users sharing copyrighted works. They complained to52 And the processing of subscriber’s personal data (here the
application of Directive 95/46/EC is not questionable since the IAP
knows the identity of his subscriber, see infra as regards other
collectors of IP addresses) could not only be done in virtue of
Article 7, f) of Directive 95/46/EC. Indeed, according to Article 5.1
of Directive 2002/58/EC, the consent of the concerned users is
required for (notably) the storage of traffic data, save as exemp-
tion to this Article provided by national law according to Article
15.1 of Directive 2002/58/EC. For instance, since Member States
can refer to the purposes set in Article 13 of Directive 95/46/EC (see
footnote no. 22), they could specify that a user addressee of the
electronic communication at stake (a website provider receiving
a request to consult a webpage, an individual receiving an email,
etc.) may store the content and traffic data of this communication
without the consent of the other users concerned. Web 2.0 plat-
form such as social network sites (Facebook, YouTube, etc.),
webmail providers, etc., could also require the contractual
consent of their users to store their IP addresses (taking the risk
that it is not freely given), etc. If the IP address is considered to be
personal data per se, then they will also have to obtain the consent
of the subscriber to the IA service if they cannot rely on another
ground according to Article 7 of the Directive 95/46/EC.
53 See the criticism of the European Data Protection Supervisor as
regards the proportionality of the three steps procedure, op. cit.,
nos. 32–49.
54 See Articles 1.1 and 3.1 of Directive 2006/24/EC.
55 Court of First Instance (Hong Kong), January 26, 2006, Cinepoly
Records Co Ltd et al. v. Hong Kong Broadband Network Ltd et al.,
[2006] HKLRD 255, n14.
61 Cour d’appel de Rennes, 3d Chamber, May 22, 2008, Cyrille S. v.
Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique (SACEM) and
Société pour l’Administration du Droit de Reproduction Mécanique des
Auteurs et Compositeurs de Musique (SDRM), retrieved on October 4,
2010, from http://www.legalis.net/.
62 Cour de Cassation, Criminal Chamber, January 13, 2009, Société
des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique (SACEM) and Société
pour l’Administration du Droit de Reproduction Mécanique des Auteurs
et Compositeurs de Musique (SDRM) v. Cyrille S., 8 Recueil Dalloz, 2009,
p. 497.
63 In the same sense see Costes L. “Téléchargement illicite
d’oeuvres : constatation de l’infraction et données personnelles”.
Revue Lamy Droit de l’Immatériel, no. 46, 2009, p. 22; Chafiol-Chau-
mont F, Bonnier A. “L’identification des “pirates duWeb” à partir de
c om p u t e r l aw & s e c u r i t y r e v i ew 2 7 ( 2 0 1 1 ) 3 4 8e3 6 1 353the police that required IAPes to identify the subscribers
behind IP addresses. Logging with the relevant software, the
sworn agents noticed peers sharing protected works in their
shared folders. Then they testedwhether the shared fileswere
downloadable and whether they were what their names
specified them to be. To identify the IP addresses of these
users and their IAPes, the agents relied on the software “Vis-
ualRoute”, consulted the “WHOIS” databases and used the
firewall “Kerio Personal Firewall”. Finally, they burned these
data and the relevant screen captures on a CD they sent to the
police. The question arose before the French court to know
whether this whole procedure amounted to the processing of
personal data since such a processing should have been
submitted to an authorization from the Commission Natio-
nale de l’Information et des Libertés [CNIL] (the French privacy
commission). In the cases submitted to courts, the sworn
agents acted without CNIL authorization and therefore, the
proof submitted should be deemed inadmissible in the initi-
ated copyright litigations.
Numerous examples exist in the French case law where IP
addresses are sometimes considered to be personal data or
they are not. In two cases discussed later in this paper,
Anthony G. v. SCPP (CA de Paris 2007)56 and Henri S. v. SCPP (CA
Paris 2007),57 relating to “KaZaA”, the Paris Court of appeals
decided that IP addresses were not personal data. Therefore,
the sworn agents did not need CNIL authorization. However,
first instance courts had already concluded to the contrary.
For instance, in Laurent F. v. SACEM et al. (TGI Bobigny 2006),
the court previously considered in the same kind of litigation,
related to “Shareaza”, that IP addresses were personal data. It
considered that such numbers establish the correspondence
between the identifier allocated to the websurfer during the
connection, and the identity of the subscriber.58 In SCPP and
SACEM v. J.P. (TGI Saint-Brieuc 2007), related to “Soulseek”, IP
addresses were personal data processed by the sworn agents.
The court made an analogy with a phone number explaining
that it is linked to a subscriber via the IAP.59 The judgment
had even been confirmed on appeal by the Rennes Court of
appeals. But the decision was finally revoked by the Cour de
cassation in SCPP et al. v. J.P. (Cass. Fr. 2009).60 The Rennes56 Cour d’appel de Paris, 13th Chamber, April 27, 2007, Anthon
G. v. Société Civile des Producteurs Phonographiques (SCPP
retrieved on October 4, 2010, from http://www.legalis.net/.
57 Cour d’appel de Paris, 13th Chamber, May 15, 2007, Henri S.
Société Civile des Producteurs Phonographiques (SCPP), retrieved o
October 4, 2010, from http://www.legalis.net/.
58 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Bobigny, December 14, 200
Laurent f. v. SACEM et al., retrieved on October 4, 2010, from http:
www.legalis.net/.
59 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Saint-Brieuc, September
2007, Société Civile des Producteurs Phonographiques (SCPP) et Socié
des Auteurs, Composieteurs et Editeurs de Musique (SACEM) v. J.P
retrieved on October 4, 2010, from http://www.legalis.net/.
60 Cour de Cassation, Criminal Chamber, June 16, 2009, Socié
Civile des Producteurs Phonographiques (SCPP) et al. v. J.P., see
COSTES, “Téléchargement illegal d’oeuvres musicales et proces
verbal de l’agent verbalisateur”, Revue Lamy Droit de l’Immatérie
no. 52, 2009, pp. 16e18.
leursadresses IP,De laqualificationduconstatprobatoirede l’agent
assermentémandaté par la SACEMauprojet de loi “HADOPI”.Revue
Lamy Droit de l’Immatériel, no. 49, 2009, p. 86; Pignatari O. “Télé-












l,Court of appeals, in Cyrille S. v. SACEM and SDRM (CA Rennes
2008),61 also explicitly ruled that an IP address is an indirectly
nominative personal data acquiring a nominative character
through the mere connection with the database owned by
the IAP. But this ruling has also been revoked by the Cour de
cassation in SACEM et al. v. Cyrille S. (Cass. Fr. 2009).62 In its
two arrests, it is crucial to underline that the Cour de
cassation did not ruled that IP addresses were not personal
data. It avoided the question.63 It rather decided that the
sworn agents’ behavior did not amount to a processing
realized through automated means.64 The Court specified that
the agent at stake made “visual findings” (“constatations
visuelles”), “manually” accessed the list of shared files and
had not recourse to a “prior automated surveillance
processing” (“traitement préalable de surveillance automatisé”).
This has been recalled by the Paris Court of appeals, to which
one of the cases had been remanded, in Cyrille S. v. SACEM
and SDRM (CA Paris 2010).65 Therefore, case law considering
that IP addresses are personal data and offer the possibility
to identify individuals is still valid.66
In a context similar to what happened in these French
cases, in Switzerland, the Federal Supreme Court decided on 8
September 2010, that “IP addresses are clearly personal data
and are thus subject to the Data Protection Act”.67
In Belgium, in 2001, the Belgian Privacy Commission simi-
larly pronounced itself. As regards the fight against copyrightdelicate avec les données personnelles et le rejet persistant de la
copie privée”. Revue LamyDroit de l’Immatériel, no. 60, 2010, p. 15 and
the references quoted by the author in footnote no. 16.
64 In the same sense, see notably Daleau J. note under Cour de
cassation, crim., 13 janvier 2009, 8 Recueil Dalloz, 2009, p. 497; Teller
M. “Les difficultés de l’identité numérique: quelle qualification
juridique pour l’adresse IP?”. Recueil Dalloz, no. 29, 2009, p. 1990.
65 Cour d’appel de Paris, 12th Chamber, February 1st, 2010, Cyrille
S. v. SACEM and SDRM, retrieved on October 4, 2010, from http://
www.legalis.net/).
66 See also supra the case law of the Tribunal de grande instance
de Paris as regards data retention obligations.
67 Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner
(Switzerland), http://www.edoeb.admin.ch/aktuell/01688/index.
html?lang¼en, last visited on October 7, 2010. See also the press
release of the Federal Court (September 8, 2010), http://www.bger.
ch/fr/mm_1c_285_2009_d.pdf, [accessed 14.12.10]. The decision
(cases nos. 1C_285/2009 and 1C_295/2009) is published in German
language on http://www.bger.ch.
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dynamic e IP addressesmust submit to data protection law in
so far as it is possible e “and easy” e to find the identity of the
individual concerned through the intermediary of the IAP.68
And in this respect, it does not matter that the right holder
has knowledge of the data, and that he is not authorized to
know these data. The advice of the Commission targeted
what the International Federation of the Phonographic
Industry [IFPI] did, that is: noticing the IP addresses of users
using Napster and related networks. More recently, in 2008,
the IFPI registered in Belgium its processing of websurfers IP
addresses for litigation purposes.69 In any case, the
identification of websurfers is necessary to the fulfillment of
the purpose pursued by IFPI and, more generally, collecting
societies, etc.
In the United States of America, on the one hand, the
Recording Industry Association of America [RIAA] began to
fight against individual infringer seven years ago.70 To identify
infringers, the RIAA followed the same kind of practical steps
as French collecting societies. It was for instance the case in
RIAA v. Charter Communications (8thCir. 2005),71 where the
“KaZaA” and “iMesh” shared peer-to-peer network was at
stake. Maverick Recording et al. v. Whitney Harper (5thCir.
2010)72 illustrates the role of the MediaSentry company in
the tracking of websurfers for the RIAA. On the other hand
however, online copyright litigation infringement has not
always been directed against websurfers. It is notably
referred to the well-known “Napster”, “Grokster” and
“StreamCast”, and “Aimster” cases. More recently, in
Columbia Pictures et al. v. Justin Bunnell et al. (C.D. Cal. 2007),7368 The Commission underlined that this identification of indi-
viduals is necessary to the fulfillment of the objective pursued e in
the case e by the IFPI, that is to say to take proceedings against
the individual who have the IP addresses at stake. Commission
for the protection of privacy (Belgium). Avis d’initiative con-
cernant la compatibilité de la recherché d’infractions au droit
d’auteur commises sur Internet avec les dispositions juridiques
protégeant les données à caractère personnel et les télécommu-
nications, n44/2001, November 12, 2001, p. 3. The advices of the
Belgian privacy commission (CPVP) are available on http://www.
privacycommission.be.
69 See the Belgian public register of processings, https://www.
privacycommission.be/elg/publicRegister.htm?
decArchiveId¼32072, declaration made by IFPI Belgium, and
published form the 22 January 2008.
70 See Electronic Frontier Foundation, “RIAA v. The People: Five
Years Later”, September 2008, retrieved on October 5, 2010, from
http://www.eff.org/riaa-v-people. For a thorough study in the
UnitedStates as regards IPaddresses, see J.J.McIntyre, “Thenumber
is me: why internet protocol (IP) addresses should be protected as
personally identifiable information”, DePaul Law Review, no. 60,
2011, forthcoming, retrieved on http://www.ssrn.com.
71 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit, April 1st, 2005, The
Recording Industry Association of America v. Charter Communications,
p. 5, from http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov [accessed 04.10.10].
72 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, February 25, 2010,
Maverick Recording Company et al. v. Whitney Harper, no. 08-51194,
pp. 2e3, from http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/ [accessed 04.10.10].
73 US District Court for the Central District of California, June 19,
2007, Columbia Pictures et al. v. Justin Bunnell et al., U.S. Dist. LEXIS
46364, from http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/torrentspy/200808
14%20judgment.pdf [accessed 07.10.10].the “Torrentspy” website was at stake. This is “a website
that serves as a search engine that enables users to
locate and download dot-torrent files”.74 The website
administrators’ responsibility was discussed. What was
interesting for the present purpose is that the district Court
ruled that “[e]ven if the users are engaged in legal file
sharing, they have little to no expectation of privacy because
they are broadcasting their identifying information to
everyone in the BitTorrent “swarm” as they download the
file”.75 A fortiori, they neither have reasonable expectation of
privacy while infringing the copyright of others. In this case,
in a previous order, Justice Chooljian requires the website
administrators to record “server logs”. These included the IP
addresses of the website users who requested dot-torrent
files. The aim of this order was to make it possible to assess
the potential website administrators’ responsibility as
regards copyright infringement made by the users. If users
have no expectation of privacy as regards what they
broadcast, it is nonetheless enlightening to note that the
judge required that IP addresses, in a nutshell, be
“encoded”.76 In doing so, Justice Chooljian therefore clearly
took into account the potential later litigation that could be
directed against these users with the help of their IP
addresses.
Coming back to Europe, as the Working Party 29 wrote: “to
argue that individuals are not identifiable, where the purpose
of the processing is precisely to identify themwould be a sheer
contradiction in terms”77 (emphasis added by author). In the
“French-like” instances, the Working Party 29 explicitly
considers that a processing of personal data is at stake. He
wrote: “in those cases where the processing of IP addresses
is carried out with the purpose of identifying the users of
the computer (for instance, by copyright holders in order to
prosecute computer users for violation of intellectual
property rights), the controller anticipates that the “means
likely reasonably to be used” to identify the persons will be
available e.g. through courts appealed to (otherwise the
collection of the information makes no sense), and therefore
the information should be considered as personal data”.78 In
a same sense, as P.J. Hustinx (European Data Protection
Supervisor) also wrote, the above-mentioned rulings of the
Paris Court of Appeal relating to the status of personal data74 Columbia Pictures et al. v. Justin Bunnell et al. (C.D. Cal. 2007), p. 2,
lines 4e5.
75 Columbia Pictures et al. v. Justin Bunnell et al. (C.D. Cal. 2007),
p. 15, line 10.
76 Justice Chooljian ordered that “defendants shall mask,
encrypt, or redact IP addresses through a hashing program or
other means, provided, however, that if a given IP address
appears more than once, such IP address is concealed in
a manner which permits one to discern that the same IP address
appears on multiple occasions”; and she specified that “Plaintiffs
are prohibited from using “brute force” or any other means to
pierce or reverse any such mask/encryption/redaction” (U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California, Magistrate
Order, May 29, 2007, Columbia Pictures et al. v. Justin Bunnel et al.,
no. CV 06-1093 FMC(JCx), p. 34, lines 3e12, from http://www.eff.
org/files/filenode/torrentspy/columbia_v_bunnell_magistrate_
order.pdf [accessed 04.10.10].).
77 WP136, p. 16.
78 WP136, p. 17.
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European legal framework”.79
Nonetheless, in another hypothesis of fight against copy-
right infringement, it can be said that IP addresses are not used
to identify websurfers. This was the case in Ireland, as regards
EMI Records et al. v. Eircom (IEHC 2010). It is important to make
the point that Justice Charleton, delivering the judgment, was
“convinced, on the basis of the affidavit evidence before [him],
that the plaintiffs have no interest at all in using this process
to find out who the copyright infringers are. Rather, what they
are interested in is having the protocol work so that the plague
of copyright infringement may be undermined”80 (emphasis
added by author). So, the aim of plaintiffs was not to
“directly take action against each such illegal downloader”.81
Therefore in their hands, IP addresses would not be personal
data. In Belgium, as regards filtering, the Brussels Court of
First Instance82 seems implicitly to have deemed that IP
addresses were not personal data. It decided this way in
a context involving filtering and blocking software that IAPes
could use to prevent peer-to-peer sharing of copyrighted
works through their networks. The court considered that
this software, like antivirus software, did not amount to
activities implying the identification of websurfers.83 But in
both the Irish and the Belgian case, the intended purpose
was to have an effect on users’ behavior. In the first case,
the user faced the risk of a suspension of his Internet
access. And in the second one, the relevant data packets
could not be communicated through the IAP network. In this
respect, such a purpose viz. to obtain a certain ““result”
element”, “to have an impact on a certain person’s rights
and interests”, has been taken into account by the Working
Party 29 in its understanding of the concept of personal data
(WP136).84 In other words, it could be argued that processing79 Hustinx PJ. Protection of personal data on-line: the issue of
IPaddresses; 2009, p. 7, fromhttp://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/
webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/EDPS/Publications/
Speeches/2009/09-04-15_adresses_IP_EN.pdf [accessed 05.10.10]
(also published in 1 Legicom, 2009, n42). At the present time, a bill
proposes to clarify the status of IP addresses, proposing that they be
protected according to the French data protection act, see http://
www.senat.fr/rap/l09-330/l09-3302.html [accessed 06.10.10].
80 EMI Records et al. v. Eircom (IEHC 2010), no. 12.
81 EMI Records et al. v. Eircom (IEHC 2010), no. 24.
82 Tribunal de Première Instance de Bruxelles, June 29, 2007, s.c.r.
l. Société belge des auteurs c. s.a. Scarlet, retrieved on October 4,
2010, from http://www.juriscom.net/documents/tpibruxelles2007
0629.pdf. An appeal has been filed against this decision, before
the Cour d’appel de Bruxelles. The latter sought a preliminary
ruling to the ECJ. At the time of finalizing the present paper, the
case is pending before the ECJ (Scarlet Extended SA v. Sabam,
Case C-70/2010), and the Advocate General Cruz Villalon has
already presented his opinion on April 14, 2011. His opinion has
however not been analyzed for the purpose of the paper.
83 The Court underlined that “les logiciels de filtrage et de blocage
ne traitent en tant que tels aucune donnée à caractère personnel;
[.] à l’instar des logiciels antivirus ou antispam, ils sont de
simples instruments techniques qui comme tels ne réalisent pas
d’activités impliquant l’identification d’internautes” (s.c.r.l. Société
belge des auteurs c. s.a. Scarlet, TPI Bruxelles, 2009, p. 10).
84 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion n4/2007 on
the concept of personal data, June 20, 2007, hereinafter referred to
as “WP136”, p. 11.of personal data could be at stake in the present cases. And
as regards the three strikes procedure, the European Data
Protection Supervisor does not hesitate to generally deem
that it involves the processing of personal data: “it is only
possible to conclude that IP addresses and the information
about the activities linked to such addresses constitutes
personal data in all cases relevant here.”85
Finally, beyond the fight against online copyright
infringement, IP addresses are clearly at the heart of litigation
related to the Internet since they constitute themost effective
means to identify an infringer, for example whether it be
question of defamation e in Doe v. Cahill (Supr. Ct. Delaware
2005)86 or in J.F. v. SAS Networks (TGI Paris 2008) e, of child
pornography e in USA v. Steiger (11thCir. 2003) e, or of the
conviction of a journalist for illegally providing state
secrecy e in Shi Tao v. Privacy Commissioner (AAB Hong Kong
2007),87 etc.
To conclude, often IP addresses are especially processed to
sue and to identify websurfers.4. Arguments against the IP addresses’
status of personal data
4.1. Limitations of the IP address as identifier
Exceptwhere the IAP provides the IP address, no one can, with
reasonablemeans andwithout any other information, identify
the subscriber/user of the address. The IP address only relates
to a computer. In Shi Tao v. Privacy Commissioner (AAB Hong
Kong 2007),88 the Hong Kong data protection ordinance was
applied.89 The Appeal Board considered that an IP address is
assigned by an ISP “to the user’s computer”90 and that such
an address “cannot reveal the exact location of the computer
concerned or the identity of the computer user”.91 So it is not
“per se” personal data. It has to be combined with other85 European Data Protection Supervisor, op. cit., no. 27.
86 The case was about defamation through blog postings,
Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, October 5, 2005, John Doe
no. 1 v. Patrick Cahill and Julia Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, No. 266, 2005.
87 Administrative Appeal Board (Hong Kong), November 26, 2007,
Shi Tao v. Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data, administrative
appeal n16 of 2007, retrieved on October 6, from http://www.
pcpd.org.hk/english/publications/files/Appeal_Yahoo.pdf.
88 As regards the case, see Office of the Privacy Commissioner for
Personal Data, Data Protection Principles in the Personal Data (Privacy)
Ordinance e from the Privacy Commissioner’s perspective, Second
Edition, Hong Kong, 2010, pp. 13e14, from http://www.pcpd.org.
hk/english/publications/files/Perspective_2nd.pdf [accessed 05.
10.10].
89 As regards the definition of personal data, Hong Kong Personal
Data (Privacy) Ordinance, Ordinance n 81 of 1995, section (2)
states: “personal data means any data (a) relating directly or
indirectly to a living individual; (b) from which it is practicable for
the identity of the individual to be directly or indirectly ascer-
tained; and (c) in a form in which access to or processing of the
data is practicable”.
90 Shi Tao v. Privacy Commissioner (AAB Hong Kong 2007), nos.
30e31.
91 Shi Tao v. Privacy Commissioner (AAB Hong Kong 2007), nos.
30e31.
99 In the United States, it seems that such reasoning would be
refuted. See US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, September
28, 2006, Klimas v. Comcast Cable Communications, Inc., 465 F.3d
271, retrieved on October 5, 2010, from http://www.ca6.uscourts.
gov/internet/index.htm. It was alleged that the IAP Comcast had
recorded the Web traffic of its subscribers (their IP addresses and
the URL visited). The relevant rule at stake related to the collection
of subscribers’ personal data, and was taken from the Cable Act
1984 (45 U.S.C.A. x 551). The Court firstly considered that the Cable
Act 1984 did not apply to broadband Internet service (p. 5). The
Court underlined that the Cable Act 1984 only defines what was
not personal data. Are not personally identifiable information,
“any record of aggregate data which does not identify particular
person”. Then the In this respect the Court considered that “[t]he
only record containing the identity of “particular persons”
mentioned in the complaint, as noted above, is the list of Comcast
internet service subscribers, which e standing alone e obviously
c om p u t e r l aw & s e c u r i t y r e v i ew 2 7 ( 2 0 1 1 ) 3 4 8e3 6 1356information.92 In the samesense, in France,93 the ParisCourt of
Appeals decided, in Anthony G. v. SCPP (CA Paris 2007), that IP
addresses were not personal data because only the legitimate
competent authority (the police, and not the collecting
society involved in the case) was able to investigate and
obtain from the IAP the identity of the subscriber at stake.
Another French court underlined, in Henri S. v. SCPP (CA Paris
2007), that an IP address related to a computer and not to the
individual who used it. In EMI Records et al. v. Eircom (IEHC
2010), the High Court of Ireland emphasized, as regards the
identity of websurfers, the following: “there seems no legal
avenue open to [the majors] to get that information apart
from an application for the names and addresses of the
copyright thieves to the internet service provider.94 It is
proved to me to be close to impossible that they could have
recovered them by any easier or less pricey means”.95 Such
a procedure therefore does not seem to constitute
a reasonable means to identify websurfers when the collector
of IP addresses does not intent to begin such a lawsuit.96
However, four nuances have to be offered in respect of the
above-mentioned reasoning. These nuances notably show that
what is a reasonablemeans to identify an individual can rapidly
expand. Firstly, depending on the purpose pursued by the
collector of the IP addresses, a judicial procedure canbedeemed
to constitute a reasonablemeans to identify a living individual.
Secondly, data in possession e or that could come in the
possessioneof the collectorhave tobe taken into account. This
has to be assessed considering the services offered by the
collector and the relevant market at stake. On the one hand,
numerous websites record their visitors’ IP addresses while, at
the same time requiring them (often by contract and through
a web form) to identify themselves on the website. This is, for
instance, the case in respect of numerous social networking
sites such as Facebook.97 In another example, Google requires
its users to give true information about themselves if asked
by the registration process of the service at stake (e.g. the
well-known Gmail).98 This means that through their different
services e e.g. YouTube and Gmail e, these companies have
the technical capacity to identify who is the user (subscriber to92 Shi Tao v. Privacy Commissioner (AAB Hong Kong 2007), nos.
30e31.
93 According to French law, in order to determine if a natural
person is identifiable, all the means that enable to realize its iden-
tificationmust beconsidering includingmeansavailable to thedata
controller or to any person, ormeans that can be accessed by these
latter, see Article 2 of the Loi n78e17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à
l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés (consolidated version of
30 June 2010), available on http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr.
94 What Justice Charleton is convinced they do not want to do,
see infra.
95 EMI Records et al. v. Eircom (IEHC 2010), no. 24.
96 In Ireland, according to section 1 of the Data Protection Act
1988, personal data are: “Data relating to a living individual who
is or can be identified either from the data or from the data in
conjunction with other information that is in, or is likely to come
into, the possession of the data controller”.
97 See clause n4: Registration and Account Security of Facebook
terms of use, available on http://www.facebook.com/terms.php?
ref¼pf [accessed 05.10.10].
98 See clause 5.1 of Google terms of service, available on http://
www.google.com/accounts/TOS?hl¼en [accessed 05.10.10].the IA service or not) behind an IP address.99 When
a company offers a service through which users are identified
and their IP addresses are recorded, such company is
technically able to identify these users with their IP addresses
through any of its services holding the record of IP addresses.
This is correct at least as long as the user is logged on to his
account.100 This is all the truer as regards cloud computing
technologies when providers offer infrastructure or platforms
as services. The IP address could be used to track a logged
user. This reasoning is also all the truer when Internet
Protocol version 6 [IPv6] addresses are used. Indeed, IPv6
addresses comprise a permanent unique identifier related to
the hardware of the user’s terminal (derived from the MAC
address).101 This means that all the connections made via the
specific terminal of a user will be identifiable and linkable.
However, this specific privacy concern could be avoided if the
default settings of IPv6 are changed, which seems possible.102
On the other hand, such a capacity to link IP addresses to
individuals also arises when companies merge in the Internet
services market. Corporate merging implies a possible data-
base merging, in any case, the capacity for a same “data
controller” to access both databases at once. Famous mergers
can be cited: Google acquired DoubleClick and also acquiredis not covered by the Act” (p. 8). It is interesting to note that the
Court previously precised that the “complaint also alleged that the
defendant had information from which it could identify its
subscribers, but not that the defendant had actually correlated the
IPeURL linkages with the subscriber list”. Therefore it seems that
in the Court’s view, it is not sufficient that a correlation may be
done between databases. For personal data to be at stake,
a correlation should have been actually done.
100 If the IPv4 address is static, then the identification is also
possible when the user is not logged onto the service. The same is
true as regards a dynamic IP address when the service provider
uses identification cookies. See infra as regards IPv6.





102 See European Commission IPv6 Task Force, Discussion docu-
ment from the European Commission IPv6 Task Force to Article 29
Data Protection Working Group, February 17, 2003, available on
http://www.ec.ipv6tf.org/PublicDocuments/Article29_v1_2.pdf,
pp. 2-3 ; IETF, T. Narten, R. Draves and S. Krishan, Privacy Exten-
sions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6, September
2007, available on http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4941.
108 See footnote no. 68.
109 After having discussed the role of IP addresses as regards the
“profile” of websurfers, the commission considered that, in any
event, it is possible, with the help of the ISP, to obtain comple-
mentary information related to the user (and to find, for instance,
his phone number, his name or his address), see Commission for
the protection of privacy, Avis d’initiative relatif à la protection de
la vie privée dans le cadre du commerce électronique, n34/2000,
22 November 2000, pp. 4e5.
110 See Commission for the protection of privacy (Belgium), Avis
relatif à l’avant-projet de loi transposant la directive 2003/98 du
Parlement européen et du Conseil concernant la réutilisation des
informations du secteur public, n4/2006, 8 February 2006, p. 4,
and two other similar advices related to the implementation
of Directive 2003/98/EC, avis n11/2006, 3 May 2006, p. 4, and
n19/2006, 12 July 2006, p. 4.; Commission for the protection of
privacy (Belgium), Avis relatif au projet de loi concernant GSM-R,
n5/2006, 1st March 2006, p. 4, footnote no. 4.
111 Commission for the protection of privacy (Belgium), Notice
explicative e déclaration ordinaire, July 2007, p. 21.
112 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion n1/2008 on
data protection issues related to search engines, April 4, 2008,
WP148, p. 8: “Though IP addresses in most cases are not directly
identifiable by search engines, identification can be achieved by
a third party. Internet access providers hold IP address data. Law
enforcement and national security authorities can gain access to
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ating the well-known megaupload.com file-sharing website,
bought Facebook Inc. e or the reverse? Clearly, the databases
of both companies pursue different purposes and should
legally be maintained separately according to the purpose
compatibility principle.103 However, it would clearly be
technically easy to track identified Facebook users’ behavior
as regards the Megaupload website via their IP addresses.
That’s the way an actual risk exists. As the web market
rapidly evolves and can rapidly change (e.g. Google Buzz
trying to enter the social network sites market), numerous
databases could merge or be accessed by a same entity.
In these cases, it even appears that “[w]ith a complete
listing of IP addresses, one can track a person’s Internet
usage”,104 even without the help of an IAP.
Thirdly, the sharing of data between affiliates has to be
taken into consideration. The Berkley study ‘KnowPrivacy’
based on the fifty most consulted websites in the United
States at the time of the study has shown the importance of
such sharing of data. This is usually foreseen in the privacy
policies ofwebsites. The study emphasized in this respect that
“[b]ased on our experience, it appears that users have no
practical way of knowing with whom their data will be
shared”, notably underlining that “MySpace, one of the most
popular social networking sites (especially among younger
users), is owned by NewsCorp, which has over 1500
subsidiaries”.105 This clearly increases the possibilities of
identification of users without the need of any IAP.
Finally, if personal data is defined in abstracto, and not from
the viewpoint of the data controller, it could be argued that
IAPes’ databases constitute themselves a reasonable means to
identify the subscribers; at least as long as the link between the
subscriber and the IPaddressat stake is recorded.Theoretically,
such a definition appears to be in use in Belgium,106 where the
travaux préparatoires of the Belgian law implementing
Directive 95/46/EC specify that a piece of information is
personal data, in so far as someone, with reasonable means, is
able to link this piece of information to a living individual.107103 See Article 6.1 (b) of Directive 95/46. An IP address recorded by
Facebook cannot be used to further identify users’ behavior on
a different website.
104 Supreme Court of the State of New Jersey, April 21, 2008, State
of New Jersey v. Shirley Reid, 195N.J. 422, 949 A.2d 850, p. 16, from
http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid¼f4f80
aa4-908e-4092-9397-29c23282be59 [accessed 05.10.10].
105 Berkeley, School of Information, J. Gomez, T. Pinnick and A.
Soltani, “KnowPrivacy”, June 1st, 2009, p. 28, retrieved on April 10,
2010, from http://knowprivacy.org/. The study continues: “[h]
owever, the numbers we compiled do not include subsidiaries of
subsidiaries”.
106 The concept of personal data is defined by Article 1, x 1 of the loi
du 8 décembre 1992 relative à la protection de la vie privée à l’égard
des traitements de données à caractère personnel, M.B. 18 mars
1993, available on http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/loi/loi.htm.
107 See Projet de loi transposant la Directive 95/46/CE du 24 octobre
1995 du Parlement européen et du Conseil relative à la protection
des personnes physiques à l’égard du traitement des données
à caractère personnel et à la libre circulation de ces données,
exposé des motifs, Doc. parl., Sénat, sess. ord. 1997e1998,
n1566/1, p. 12, from http://www.senate.be/www/?MIval¼/index_
senate&MENUID¼10000&LANG¼fr [accessed 07.10.09].These considerations implicitly rely on recital 26 of Directive
95/46/EC. And beyond the context of the fight against
copyright,108 the Belgian Privacy Commission has appeared to
consider IP addresses as being personal data. The Commission
repeated it six times: first in 2000 there was advice,109 then, in
four further advises,110 and moreover in an explicative notice
related to the declaration of processing.111 The Working Party
29 also already seemed to have such an in abstracto
understanding of IP addresses as personal data in its WP148
related to search engines112 and its WP58.113 This was also the
case in the International Working Group on Data Protection in
Telecommunications.114,115 And the Advocate General Cruz
Villalon seems to share the same view too.116these data and in someMember States private parties have gained
access also through civil litigation. Thus, inmost casese including
cases with dynamic IP address allocation e the necessary data will
be available to identify the user(s) of the IP address”.
113 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion n2/2002 on
the use of unique identifiers in telecommunication terminal
equipments: the example of IPv6, May 30, 2002, WP58, p. 3.
114 The International Working Group on Data Protection in Tele-
communications has globally considered that: “It is now widely
recognized that IP address e and a fortiori a unique identification
number integrated in the address e can be considered as
personal data in the sense of the legal framework” (International
Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications,
“Working Paper on the Use of Unique Identifiers in Telecommu-
nication Terminal Equipment: The Example of IPv6”, 31st meeting
of the International Working Group on Data Protection in Tele-
communications on 26e27 March 2002 in Auckland, p. 2).
115 It also seemed that IP addresses are personal data for all the
European privacy commissions (“L’adresse IP est une donnée à car-
actère personnel pour l’ensemble des CNIL européennes”), see http://
www.cnil.fr/index.php?id¼2244, [accessed 06.03.08]. However
for instance, the UK Information Commissioner’s Office does not
seem to have such a cut view about the topic, see footnote no. 150.
116 Opinion of the Advocate General Cruz Villalon, Case C-70/
2010, op. cit., nos. 75e78.
125 WP136, p. 6.
126 If the subscriber is a living individual, then the public IP
address is related to such an individual and can fall in the scope
of Directive 95/46/EC.
127 Admittedly, it is most probably not the case as regards
a familial housing. But generally, the subscription to IA service
is made by a living individual. The case of private students
housings could be more debatable. Indeed, the owner could
have created, for instance, a real-estate company. And the
subscription to Internet access could have been made by the
legal person while there is no traffic monitoring of the use of
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not protected under Directive 95/46/EC
This applies for instance, in the case of Network Address
Translation (NAT) used for a corporate, university and Internet
café, etc., networks. In Shi Tao v. Privacy Commissioner (AAB
Hong Kong 2007), Yahoo! communicated Yahoo! account
registration informationandtrafficdata (IPaddress,date,hour,
phone number and even some content data related to emails)
to the competent authorities investigating the identity of
a journalist. The journalist divulgated information sent by the
Chinese government to the newspaper he worked for. The
Appeal board concluded that evencoupledwith thesedata, the
IP address was not personal data. Therefore, Yahoo! had not
communicated personal data. Reaching that conclusion, the
board stated that “the Verdict does not indicate that the cor-
responding user information of the IP address belong to the
Appellant or reveal the Appellant’s identity”.117 It also
underlined that “the address of the account holder will be the
address of a business, rather than an individual’s address”.118
Also, as regards the registration information of the users of
Yahoo! email services, “There was no guarantee that the
information so provided was genuine as many users did not
register with real information”.119 Anyway “the user name of
the Email Account registered with yahoo.com.cn was not the
name of the Appellant”.120 So the conclusion of the Appeal
Board was that: “the Email Address, or the IP address, did not
ex facie reveal the identity of the Appelant. The information
provided by Beijing Yahoo! only disclosed that the email was
sent from a computer located at the address of a business entity,
and the date and time of the transaction. Short of CCTV
evidence, it would not be reasonably practicable from such
information to ascertain that it was actually the Appellant
who used the computer identified by the IP address to send
out the relevant email at the material time [(emphasis added
by author)]. It could have been anyone, as long as he had
access to that computer (or had the necessary password if
one was required at all)”.121 The Board is “of the view that
although the information provided to the PRC authorities
related indirectly to an individual, it was not such as would
enable the identity of the Appellant to be ascertained directly
or indirectly with reasonable practicability”122 (emphasis added
by author).
When NAT is used, different users have the same public IP
addresswhile they each have their own in the private network
(of a business, university, Internet café,123 familial housing,
etc.).124 In such a hypothesis, two elements have to be
discussed as shown by the previous case. On the one hand, it117 Shi Tao v. Privacy Commissioner (AAB Hong Kong 2007), no. 63.
118 Shi Tao v. Privacy Commissioner (AAB Hong Kong 2007), no. 64.
119 Shi Tao v. Privacy Commissioner (AAB Hong Kong 2007), no. 64.
120 Shi Tao v. Privacy Commissioner (AAB Hong Kong 2007), no. 66.
121 Shi Tao v. Privacy Commissioner (AAB Hong Kong 2007), no. 67.
122 Shi Tao v. Privacy Commissioner (AAB Hong Kong 2007), nos.
69e70. It is important to note that the ruling of the Court would
have been different if an IAP was at stake, see no. 71.
123 See infra footnote no. 131.
124 Sometimes, computers in a corporate (or other) network have
each their own public IP address, which means that NAT is not
used. In such cases, what is explained about NAT is all the truer.is true that different people can use the computers at stake
and that it cannot necessarily be ascertained who actually
used the computer at any one time. However, clearly, in
European data protection law, “[f]or information to be
‘personal data’, it is not necessary that it be true or
proven”.125 In other words, it does not matter to whom the
information at stake is related, insofar as it is related to
a living individual. On the other hand, when the subscriber to
an Internet access service is a legal entity,126 the public IP
address appears not to be linked to a living individual.
However, the local network administrator may record the use
of the private network by its users (employees, students,
members of a family,127 etc.) and identify them via their login
information or even with the Medium Access Control
address128 [MAC address] of their computer, used for network
monitoring (security, integrity, etc.) purposes. Since the MAC
address is a unique hardware identifier of a computer
network card, identification of the user via his computer is
then possible if no specific login is required. J.J. McIntyre129
quotes an interesting American case, USA v. J.T. Heckenkamp
(9thCir. 2007),130 where a network administrator identified
a student in the network of his university. Usually, while
a student connects to the Internet in their university or
school, they do it through their personal login that identifies
them. But it has to be conceded that if the administrator of
the private network does not record what happens over his
network, then it remains impossible to identify a particular
terminal of the network and the IP address can no more be
related to a living individual. Such a case however will most
probably be a rare exception, while the use of networks
remains monitored as a general rule. Also, network
administrators generally know who has which login. Finally,
again, the transition to the IPv6 can make the identification
of terminals, and therefore of users, easier. Broadcasting
a unique identifier derived from the MAC address would
imply that the server log files are no longer necessary to
identify the used terminal and its user.the connection.
128 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers IEEE Standard
for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Overview and Archi-
tecture. IEEE Std 802-2001, pp. 6, 11 and 20e21, from http://
standards.ieee.org/getieee802/download/802-2001.pdf [accessed
07.10.10].
129 McIntyre JJ. The number is me: why internet protocol (IP)
addresses should be protected as personally identifiable infor-
mation. DePaul Law Review, no. 60, 2011, forthcoming, retrieved on
http://www.ssrn.com.
130 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, USA v. Jerome T.
Heckenkamp, April 5, 2007, 82 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2007), pp. 3e6,
from http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2007/04/
04/0510322.pdf [accessed 06.10.10].
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Less usual uses of Internet include public proxies with NAT
servers (other than the cases of NAT abovementioned)131 and
IP spoofing.
“IP Spoofing”132 refers to a kind of usurpation of someone
else’s IP address. It appears to be associated with computer
attacks as it is for instance used for “Man in the Middle
Attacks” (aka “TCP Hijacking”)133 and also “is a frequent tool
in distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and
intrusions.134 Such hypotheses, where computer hacking is
at stake, does not seem relevant as regards the qualification
of an IP address.
More relevant is the use of a public proxy server, that is to
say: “a computer system or router that breaks the connection
between sender and receiver”.135 A proxy server relays the
request of websurfers. This means that, when surfing the
Web, the users of the proxy will appear “undercover” with
the public IP address given by the proxy server. And the
actual IP address he was allocated from his IAP will only be
disclosed to the proxy server. Then, if the proxy is provided
by a legal person, the public IP address no more relates to an
identifiable living individual. But it can be observed that the
proxy server might store the different connections realized
by the individual having recourse to his service. He can even
store his client information (identity and credit card
number) if the proxy service is a service for which the
websurfer has to pay. So, with the collaboration of the proxy
server provider, the original IP address of the websurfer may
be revealed. However, if the proxy server provider never
stores his users’ traffic data, these latter become, as a rule,
no longer identifiable.131 We separated this case as relevant to the previously dis-
cussed hypothesis of NAT for two main reasons. On the one
hand, as regards proxies now discussed, there are two public IP
addresses: the one of the proxy server and the one given by its
IAP to the websurfer. And on the other hand, in the NAT case
abovementioned, the user is “affiliated” at least to some extent
with the corporate (or individual) that provide him Internet
access (a relative in the family housing, his employer who
provides the corporate network, the administrator of the
Internet café where he connects to the Web, the University
where he is a registered student, etc.). In other words, in the
present hypothesis, the linkage between an individual and the
broadcasted IP address is less probable. Admittedly, the same
could be sometimes said about an Internet café (if the owner of
the Internet café does not record anything about the use of the
computer he rents).
132 “IP spoofing is the practise of forging various portions of the
Internet Protocol (IP)”, http://spoofer.csail.mit.edu/faq.php,
[accessed 07.10.10].
133 See Gerphagnon J-O, Portes de Albuquerque M, Portes de
Albuquerque M. Sécurité informatique, Attaques informatiques,
pp. 7e13, from http://www.rederio.br/downloads/pdf/nt00700.pdf
[accessed 07.10.10].
134 Kissel E, Mirkovic J. Comparative evaluation of spoofing
defenses. USC/ISI technical report number ISI-TR-655, January
2009, p. 1, from http://www.isi.edu/wmirkovic/publications/spo
ofer.pdf [accessed 07.10.10].
135 PCMAG.com Encyclopedia, http://www.pcmag.com/encycl
opedia_term/0,2542,t¼proxyþserver&i¼49892,00.asp, [accessed
07.10.10].4.4. Processing IP addresses within Directive 95/46/EC
Tosubject theprocessingof IPaddresses toDirective95/46/ECis
too high a cost for the Internet industry. As P.J. Hustinx rightly
observed, if IP addresses are considered to be “often” personal
data, “the consequence is that large parts of the Internet
economywill besubject todataprotectionsafeguardse suchas
specific obligations for responsible parties and oversight by
supervisory authorities e at least in the European Union”.136
This is an economico-political argument that raises concerns
the present paper cannot deal with. One can only note some
brief considerations. Firstly, IP addresses are already targeted
by Article 5.1 of Directive 2002/58/EC137 so their processing is
not completely free. Secondly, not all information society
service providers record the IP addresses of their users, nor do
they have to do so. For instance, “Ixquick” search engine
providers do not record the IP addresses of their users,138 and
it seems that “Torrentspy” website providers do not either.139
It is possible for website providers not to store “Server Log
Data” (notably IP addresses and requests of their users). For
instance, Microsoft Internet Information Service 6.0 makes it
possible to disable its logging functionality. The requests of
users may also be diverted through an intermediary proxy
who caches the website at stake and is geographically closer
to the users that request a page. This then prevents the
website provider from knowing server log data.140
In any case, if the processing of IP addresseswas technically
necessary to provide the service, such processing would nor-
mally not be problematic as regards privacy. Even as regards
data protection, it would be necessary for the performance of
the contract e provision of a service. And thirdly, if general136 Hustinx PJ. Protection of personal data on-line: the issue of IP
addresses, 2009, p. 1, from http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/
webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/EDPS/Publications/
Speeches/2009/09-04-15_adresses_IP_EN.pdf [accessed 05.10.10]
(also published in 1 Legicom, 2009, n42). At the present time, a bill
proposes to clarify the status of IP addresses, proposing that they
be protected according to the French data protection act, seehttp://
www.senat.fr/rap/l09-330/l09-3302.html, [accessed 06.10.10].
137 See supra. In this respect, it could be argued that it is therefore
not useful to consider IP addresses as personal data. However, the
scope of Article 5 of Directive 2002/58/EC could be disputed. For
instance, it could clearly be argued that this Directive only applies
when personal data are processed (see Article 1, xx 1 and 2, and Article
3, x 1). And that article 5 has no specific scope that could derogate
from the general scope of the directive. This could lead to the
conclusion that IP addresses, if they are not considered as
personal data, would only be protected as traffic data if they are
processed with other personal data. Anyway, Article 5 of Direc-
tive would not solve all the problems linked to the processing of
IP addresses not considered as personal data. While if IP
addresses are personal data, they are at least covered by the
general data protection regime. For instance, this regime would
limit the period of storage of the data. Therefore, implementation
difficulties are also avoided.
138 See http://www.ixquick.com/fra/protect-privacy.html [accessed
05.10.10].
139 Columbia Pictures et al. v. Justin Bunnell et al. (C.D. Cal. 2007), p. 7,
lines 15e16.
140 Columbia Pictures et al. v. Justin Bunnell et al. (C.D. Cal. 2007), pp.
7e8 and 8e10. Of course, if logs are not stored by the proxy and, if
they are, if they are not sent back to the website provider.
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regards the processing of IP addresses,141 the legislator might
set up, as the case may be, a lighter regime than the general
data protection one. In this respect, the legislator would have
to act according to Article 13, xx 1, (g), and 2, and Article 18, x
2, of Directive 95/46/EC (more specifically, Article 13 xx 1, (g)
and 2) in establishing this specific legal regime.142 For
instance, a service provider processing IP addresses of its
subscribers would not have to register his processing, while
the national implementation of Article 6 of Directive 95/46/
EC would fully apply to this processing.144 What has already be done by the Working Party 29 (see foot-
note no. 112), what the Paris Court of Appeals has already refused
to do (Anthony G. v. SCPP (CA Paris 2007) and Cyrille S. v. SACEM and
SDRM (CA Paris 2010)). In EMI Records et al. v. Eircom (IEHC 2010) the
High Court of Ireland equally refused to consider that personal
data were at stake as regards the majors because they did not
have the intent to sue websurfers (while it nonetheless remained
possible).
145 That is to say notably even when the service provider knows5. When are IP addresses personal data?
From previous developments, we can infer the following
hypotheses where IP addresses generally are e or are
not e personal data. For European IAPes, according to their
data retention duties, IP addresses related to living individuals
subscribers are personal data at least for a period of sixmonth
and, as a rule, depending on the applicable law to their data
retention obligations, for a maximum period of two years.
Beyond, data should be suppressed. So, it should no more be
possible to link the IP addresses at stake to individuals.
When collecting societies (or more generally, rights
owners, law enforcement authorities or private investigators)
collect and record IP addresses for the purpose of suing and
identifying websurfers, IP addresses are personal data.
However, the period of retention of IAPes’ logs has to be taken
into account. Indeed, two years after the original collection of
an IP address and the relevant related data (e.g. the visited
website and the time of the connection, the shared folders,
etc.), the IAPes should no more be able to identify the
subscriber towhom they allocated the address. Therefore, this
address and the associated data cease being personal data
exceptwhere othermeans of identification are available to the
collectors (e.g. the identity of the user, or his pseudonym and
a more recent IP address, etc.).
Sometimes, information society services providers (e.g.
websites, web 2.0 websites, cloud computing service, etc.)
collect and store users’ IP addresses and contractually require
them simultaneously to identify themselves when they
register on the service. In such cases all collected IP addresses
linked with the user account are personal data. The same is
true as regards IP addresses collected via other provided
services, if the user is logged onto his account or if he has
a static IPe or an IPv6e address.143 Indeed, the reasoning is all
the truer when the IP address constitutes a unique and
permanent identifier. The same reasoning can also apply,
mutatis mutandis, in case of companies’ merger, or between141 Which could have lead to the case law studied in the present
paper.
142 As regards the idea of subjecting the processing of IP
addresses to a specific legal regime, see for instance, in the same
sense in France, F. Chafiol-Chaumont and A. Bonnier. “L’identi-
fication des “pirates du Web” à partir de leurs adresses IP, De la
qualification du constat probatoire de l’agent assermenté
mandaté par la SACEM au projet de loi “HADOPI”. Revue Lamy
Droit de l’Immatériel, no. 49, 2009, p. 89.
143 See supra as regards IPv6 addresses.subsidiaries and parent, when databases of different entities
make it possible to link an IP address with the identity of its
user otherwise collected.
Things become more complicated when information
society service providers collect their users’ IP addresses
without otherwise requiring any identification. It could be
argued that litigation e civil or criminal e constitutes
a reasonablemeans to identify users.144 This would imply that
IP addresses would not only be personal data for (and
processed by) the litigant collecting party and the
information society service provider communicating the IP
address, but from the original collection by this provider. It
should go this way, as long as the relevant IAPes have to
maintain the links between their subscribers and the
allocated IP addresses and as long as the provider does not
limit his processing as explained below.
Indeed and in any case,145 if the provider strictly limits its
processing of IP addresses to the technical and temporary
storage,146 e or, as the case may be, transmission e required
for the provision of the service (including some kind of
advertisement),147 and if there are thus no practical means
(e.g. software or a function of software) set up to retrieve
these addresses for another purpose, then it is clear that IP
addresses should not be processed as personal data.148 In
some respects, just as directive 2002/58/EC specifies that its
Article 5.1 “shall not prevent technical storage which is
necessary for the conveyance of a communication without
prejudice to the principle of confidentiality”,149 the sole
purpose of the processing then would be strictly limited to
the provision of the service, and IP addresses would
processed e and stored e for a very limited period of time.
However, in all the hypotheses where we concluded that IP
addresses are personal data, the use of NAT (through proxies
or through the servers/routers of a legal person’s private
network) is problematic as it can imply that IP addresses relate
to non-identifiable e with reasonable means e living indi-
viduals. This hypothesis has been described above. Then, IP
addresses can no more be personal data, and the previous
general conclusion is jeopardized.the identity of his users.
146 E.g. in RAM (Random Access Memory).
147 E.g. when the IP address is temporary sent to an advertiser for
the purpose of delivering an advertisement, on real-time, adapted
to the visited webpage and to the geographic location of the
websurfer, the IP address being then no further record by the
advertiser.
148 If IP addresses are stored for a ten of hours simply to process
the request of the users, there is no reasonable mean to identify
him. But if the service provider is asked by a competent authority.
149 Article 5.1, in fine, of Directive 2002/58/EC.
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impossible e to draw a general conclusion to qualify IP
addresses as always either being or not being personal data.
Moreover, the quoted case law illustrates how judges have
difficulties in qualifying IP addresses. It is true that, most
probably, these difficulties arise from the fact that the appli-
cation of the data protection regime is problematic in the
cases at stake and that the judges, in order to settle the liti-
gation in an acceptable way, might have to decide that IP
addresses are not personal data, thereby avoiding the
unwanted effects of the general data protection regime.
However that may be, a “relative” understanding of personal
data is helpful because both to conclude either never or
always that IP addresses are personal data is misleading. The
concept of personal data is, for instance, “relative” in the
United Kingdom150 and in Germany.151 Such definition of
personal data focuses on the concrete hypothesis at stake,
looking at the situation of the controller. This means, in
a nutshell, that information is personal data if the data
controller has other pieces of information that make it
possible to identify the data subject. More precisely, to
reconcile our contextual conclusions, we suggest a contextual
understanding of personal data, taking into account who
collects IP addresses (the suspected “data controller”) and
who might likely access e or be given access to e these
collected data. Therefore, the means available to the potential
controller (i.e. the collector of IP addresses and linked data)150 For instance in the United Kingdom, “the same piece of data
may be personal data in one party’s hands while it may not be
personal data in another party’s hands” (Information Commis-
sioner’s Office. Data protection technical guidance determining
what is personal data. p. 11, from http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/
documents/library/data_protection/detailed_specialist_guides/pe
rsonal_data_flowchart_v1_with_preface001.pdf, [accessed 05.10.
10]). According to the UK Data Protection Act 1998, Section 1 (1):
personal data “means data which relate to a living individual
who can be identified e (a) from those data, or (b) from those
data and other information which is in the possession of, or is
likely to come into the possession of, the data controller”
(emphasis added by author). See Korff D. Country studies,
Germany. In: Comparative study on different approaches to
new privacy challenges. June 2010, p. 3, from http://ec.europa.
eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/studies/new_privacy_challenges
/final_report_country_report_A6_united_kingdom.pdf [accessed
05.10.10]. See p. 6 as regards IP addresses where the author
points out that for the UK Information Commissioner’s Office
seems to consider that IP addresses are not personal data for
websites operators e but for IAPes as long as they retain
identification data e, except if “if they are actually used by the
operator to collate the data from different visits, i.e. to build up
a “profile” of the visitor” (p. 6). See also Information
Commissioner’s Office. Data protection good practice note,




151 See Korff D. Country studies, Germany. In: Comparative study
on different approaches to new privacy challenges. May 2010, p.
4, from http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/studies/
new_privacy_challenges/final_report_country_report_A4_
germany.pdf, [accessed 05.10.10]. The author concludes from this
sense of personal data that IP addresses are personal data for
IAPes but not for the other ones.are taken into account. Working Party 29 has itself written:
“[T]he extent to which certain identifiers are sufficient to
achieve identification is something dependent on the context of
the particular situation” (emphasis added by author).152
Working Party 29 also wrote: “[U]nless the Internet Service
Provider is in a position to distinguish with absolute certainty
that the data correspond to users that cannot be identified, it
will have to treat all IP information as personal data, to be on
the safe side”.153 In this statement thus appears a kind of
precautionary principle. In our view with regard to the
hypothesis we identified above where IP addresses are
generally considered to be personal data, the collector of IP
addresses should be presumed to be the data controller. He
would bear the burden of demonstrating the contrary if he
does not process IP addresses as personal data (e.g. the IP
addresses collected relate to a proxy using a NAT server and
whose provider does not store log data). On the other hand,
as regards the hypothesis where we concluded that IP
addresses are generally not personal data, they should be
presumed as not comprising personal data, except if the
potential data subject demonstrates the contrary.
Finally, if economically, it is considered that it is “too
much” for the Internet industry to consider IP addresses as
personal data in the above-mentioned cases e with so much
money being at stake e Member States are then totally free to
adopt exemptions and restrictions to their data protection
regimes, as has been suggested. In these circumstances they
should then be politically interested in assessing the question.
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